La metafísica de orden superior: el caso del realismo fregeano
DOI: https://doi.org/10.15691/0718-5448Vol7Iss1a449
Resumen
La metafísica de orden superior es un programa de investigación emergente que pretende dar cuenta de los problemas metafísicos usando las herramientas de la lógica de orden superior. En este estudio crítico se muestran algunos de los antecedentes relevantes que llevaron a este cambio de paradigma que se está produciendo en la metafísica analítica. Dentro de este contexto, se analiza el caso del realismo fregeano. Se trata de un movimiento reciente que usa los recursos de la lógica de orden superior para articular una teoría de propiedades y proposiciones. La idea central de esta concepción es que las propiedades no son objetos, sino las condiciones de satisfacción de los predicados. Esta distinción excluyente entre propiedades y objetos se aplica a diferentes problemas metafísicos. Para el realismo fregeano estos puzles se presentan como pseudo problemas que surgen por hablar de las propiedades como si fuesen objetos.
Referencias
Bacon, Andrew. A Philosophical Introduction to Higher-Order Logics. New York and London: Routledge, 2023.
Boolos, George. "Nominalistic Platonism." Philosophical Review 94, no. 3 (1985): 327-344.
Boolos, George. "To Be Is to Be a Value of a Variable (or to Be Some Values of Some Variables)." Journal of Philosophy 81 (1984): 430-439.
Button, Tim, y Robert Trueman. "A Fictionalist Theory of Universals." In Higher-Order Metaphysics, edited by Peter Fritz and Nicholas K. Jones. Oxford University Press, forthcoming.
Eklund, Matti. "On How Logic Became First-Order." Nordic Journal of Philo-sophical Logic 1 (1996): 147–67.
Ewald, William. "The Emergence of First-Order Logic." The Stanford Encyclo-pedia of Philosophy, Spring 2019 Edition. Edward N. Zalta (ed.). URL: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entries/logic-firstorder-emergence/.
Fritz, Peter, y Nicholas K. Jones. Higher-Order Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming.
Gödel, Kurt. "On Formally Undecidable Propositions of Principia Mathematica and Related Systems I." In Gödel 1986, pp. 145–195. Originally published as "Uber formal unentscheidbare Satze der Principia mathematica und ver-wandter Systeme I", Monatshefte fur Mathematik und Physik 38 (1931): 173–198.
Gödel, Kurt. Collected Works, vol. I. Oxford University Press, 1986.
Hilbert, David, and Ackermann, Wilhelm. Grundzüge der Theoretischen Logik. Berlin: J. Springer, 1928, 2nd edn.
Jones, Nicholas K. "A Higher-Order Solution to the Problem of the Concept Horse." Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 3 (2016): 132-166.
Jones, Nicholas K. "Nominalist Realism." Nous (2017): 1-28.
King, Jeffrey, Scott Soames, and Jeff Speaks (eds.). New Thinking About Propo-sitions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.
Lederman, Harvey. "Higher-Order Metaphysics and Propositional Attitudes." In Higher-Order Metaphysics, edited by Peter Fritz and Nicholas K. Jones. Oxford University Press, forthcoming.
Löwenheim, Leopold. "On Possibilities in the Calculus of Relatives." In From Frege to Gödel, edited by Jean van Heijenoort, pp. 228–251. Originally published as "Uber Moglichkeiten im Relativkalkul", Mathematische Annalen 76 (1915): 447–470.
Moore, Gregory H. "Beyond First-Order Logic: The Historical Interplay Between Mathematical Logic and Axiomatic Set Theory." History and Philosophy of Logic I (1980): 95–137.
Moore, Gregory H. "The Emergence of First-Order Logic." In History and Philosophy of Modern Mathematics, edited by William Aspray and Philip Kitcher, pp. 95–135. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988.
Prior, Arthur N. Objects of Thought. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971.
Quine, Willard Van Orman. From a Logical Point of View, 2nd edn. New York: Harper & Row, 1961.
Quine, Willard Van Orman. Philosophy of Logic. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1970.
Rayo, Agustin, and Stephen Yablo. "Nominalism through De-nominalization." Nous 35, no. 1 (2001): 74–92.
Shapiro, Stewart. Foundations Without Foundationalism. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991.
Sider, Ted. "Crash Course on Higher-Order Logic." Teaching document, 2022.
Sider, Ted. "Higher-Order Metametaphysics." En curso de publicación.
Skiba, Lukas. "Higher-Order Metaphysics." Philosophy Compass 16, no. 10 (2021).
Skolem, Thoralf. "Some Remarks on Axiomatized Set Theory." In From Frege to Gödel, edited by Jean van Heijenoort, pp. 290–301. Originally published as "Einige Bemerkungen zur axiomatischen Begrundung der Mengenlehre", Matematikerkongressen i Helsingfors den 4–7 Juli 1922, Den femte skan-dinaviska matematikerkongressen, Redogorelse, Akademiska Bokhandeln, Helsinki, 1922, pp. 217–232.
Soames, Scott. "Cognitive Propositions." In New Thinking About Propositions, edited by J. King, S. Soames, and J. Speaks, pp. 91-124. Oxford University Press, 2014.
Trueman, Robert. Properties and Propositions: The Metaphysics of Higher-Order Logic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021.
van Heijenoort, Jean. From Frege to Gödel: A Source Book in Mathematical Logic, 1879–1931. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967.
Williamson, Timothy. "Everything." Philosophical Perspectives 17 (2013): 415–65.
Williamson, Timothy. Modal Logic as Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.
Enlaces refback
- No hay ningún enlace refback.
Copyright (c) 2024 Felipe Esteban Carrasco Figueroa
Este obra está bajo una licencia de Creative Commons Reconocimiento-CompartirIgual 4.0 Internacional.
