Filosofía, historia de la filosofía y pensamiento antiguo

Marcelo Boeri


DOI: https://doi.org/10.15691/0718-5448Vol3Iss1a312
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Resumen

After physical reality began to be considered mathematically, and the Aristotelian conception of the world was abandoned one should accept that the world the Ancient Greeks were in the habit of considering has disappeared. One might also say that the world is not today what it used to be some decades ago. The technological revolution and its progress, the sophistication of methods of communication, the appearance of new illnesses and calamities indicate that our world is no longer the world that was known by the philosophers and scientists of the first decades of the 20th century. Ancient philosophers did not have to face these kinds of problems. My claim in this paper is that Ancient philosophy can be regarded as living thought and hence not as a “piece of archaeology”. I shall examine first some possible ways of considering the study of Ancient philosophy. Secondly, I will provide some examples of philosophical problems posited by Ancient philosophers that have been considered seriously by some distinguished contemporary philosophers. Finally, I will give some concluding remarks.


Boeri M. Filosofía, historia de la filosofía y pensamiento antiguo. Síntesis. 2020;3(1): 78-107. Disponible en: doi:10.15691/0718-5448Vol3Iss1a312 [Accessed 21 Oct. 2020].
Boeri, M. (2020). Filosofía, historia de la filosofía y pensamiento antiguo. Síntesis. Revista de Filosofía, 3(1), 78-107. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.15691/0718-5448Vol3Iss1a312

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