Why Fossil Fuel Exporters must accept their Emissions Liability

Jeremy Moss, Steve Pye


DOI: https://doi.org/10.15691/0718-5448Vol8Iss2a501
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Resumen

As the window of opportunity to limit global heating reduces, it is now morally and practically indefensible for states to advocate for domestic emissions reductions while simultaneously championing fossil fuel exports. The practice of exporting fossil fuels and its influence on global emissions must receive greater scrutiny. In this paper we explain why states should reduce their fossil fuel exports, highlight the extent of the problem, and explore some possible solutions: States must accept that action on climate change must include reducing their direct domestic emissions as well as the emissions associated with their fossil fuel exports. Lack of consideration of the impact of export emissions is a significant roadblock to climate action. National (and ambitious) emissions targets should include targets to reduce export emissions and domestic emissions. The COP process needs to fully acknowledge the need for a plan to phase out all fossil fuels, including reductions in exports.


Moss J, Pye S. Why Fossil Fuel Exporters must accept their Emissions Liability. Síntesis, Rev filos.. 2025;8(2): 140- 153. Disponible en: doi:10.15691/0718-5448Vol8Iss2a501 [Accessed 28 dic. 2025].
Moss, J., & Pye, S. (2025). Why Fossil Fuel Exporters must accept their Emissions Liability. Síntesis. Revista de Filosofía, 8(2), 140- 153. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.15691/0718-5448Vol8Iss2a501

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