Monismo prioritario, relaciones internas y libertad modal

Sebastián Briceño


DOI: https://doi.org/10.15691/0718-5448Vol5Iss1a375
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Resumen

Schaffer ha argumentado que la prioridad ontológica del cosmos puede ser inferida a partir de la ausencia de la libertad modal de sus partes. En este artículo ofrezco razones en contra de las siguientes premisas de su argumento: (i) el supuesto según el cual los objetos fundamentales gozan de libertad modal, y (ii) el supuesto según el cual los objetos que están en la relación de ser compañeros de mundo, dada la teoría de contrapartidas, carecen de libertad modal.


Briceño S. Monismo prioritario, relaciones internas y libertad modal. Síntesis, Rev filos.. 2022;5(1): 35-53. Disponible en: doi:10.15691/0718-5448Vol5Iss1a375 [Accessed 2 Dec. 2022].
Briceño, S. (2022). Monismo prioritario, relaciones internas y libertad modal. Síntesis. Revista de Filosofía, 5(1), 35-53. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.15691/0718-5448Vol5Iss1a375

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