



# FAITH WITHOUT APPLAUSE NAVIGATING THE PRAISEWORTHINESS PUZZLE

Nicholas S. Noyola<sup>1</sup>

Miami Dade College

Recibido: 30.06.2023 - Aceptado: 14.07.2024

## ABSTRACT

This paper addresses the praiseworthiness dilemma posed by Taylor Cyr and Matthew Flummer, which questions whether faith, as a fulfillment of moral obligation, warrants moral praise. By examining two theological concerns—Semi-Pelagianism and the Praiseworthiness Worry—the paper explores the tension between human faith and divine grace. After analyzing three strategies proposed by Cyr and Flummer, I argue that while fulfilling obligations may demonstrate praiseworthy traits, it does not inherently render individuals praiseworthy. The proposed framework reconciles faith as moral duty with God's praiseworthiness, alleviating the issue of moral praise.

Keywords: Praiseworthiness Dilemma, Faith, Moral Obligation, Divine Grace, Semi-Pelagianism, Cyr and Flummer, Theological Ethics.

---

<sup>1</sup> [nnoyola79@gmail.com](mailto:nnoyola79@gmail.com)

## 1. INTRODUCTION

Taylor Cyr and Matthew Flummer have argued that understanding faith to be the fulfillment of a moral obligation for which persons are not praiseworthy gives rise to a dilemma. The dilemma can be stated as follows: either people are morally praiseworthy for keeping their moral obligations or they aren't. If they are, then people are morally praiseworthy for the exercise of faith. If they are not, then people are not morally praiseworthy for the exercise of faith. However, it would then seem that neither is God praiseworthy for fulfilling his moral duties—such as keeping his promises. Each of these options provides an obstacle for the person who understands faith to be the fulfillment of a moral obligation for which persons are not praiseworthy. Cyr and Flummer briefly sketch three proposals for reconciling Christian doctrines of grace, faith, and praise, none of which are entirely satisfactory.

In the following paper, I offer a brief sketch of two theological worries an account of faith should be mindful of. These worries motivate the nuanced proposals currently being discussed amongst analytic theologians. I then provide a reassessment of the three proposals suggested by Cyr and Flummer. Developing on their second and third proposal, I suggest that people are not praiseworthy for keeping moral obligations, nevertheless, the fulfillment of moral obligations does serve to demonstrate the praiseworthy characteristics of an individual. I show how the proposal can account for three features of praise: (1) God's praiseworthiness, (2) the praiseworthiness of fulfilling demanding duties, and (3) varying degrees of praiseworthiness. In conclusion, while a full-orbed account of faith requires much more than an explanation as to why people are not praiseworthy in the events culminating in their salvation, the person who understands faith to be the fulfillment of a moral obligation does not have to worry about the problem of moral praise.

## 2. TWO SOTERIOLOGICAL WORRIES

Philosophers of Religion have recently offered several explanations of how a person exercises saving faith.<sup>2</sup> These proposals attempt to avoid two theological worries. The first worry is known as the Semi-pelagian Worry (SW). To avoid the SW, Kevin Timpe writes; “a fallen individual cannot even be a cause of their

---

<sup>2</sup> Typically these Philosophers present their proposals as a resolution to a trilemma between the Christian doctrines of faith, grace, and free will. As we shall see the central question revolves around how a person comes to exercise saving faith.

own saving faith”.<sup>3</sup> The motivation to avoid the SW arises from a commitment to be consistent with the teachings consolidated at the Second Council of Orange (529). The second worry has been designated the Praiseworthiness Worry (PW). Cyr and Flummer write; “as we read the passages from the Second Council of Orange and from Augustine, we take it that the condemned view is that praise should be due to the human being for some part of salvation”.<sup>4</sup> Cyr and Flummer take the PW to be the foundational worry behind the condemnation of Semi-Pelagianism. For ease of discussion, this paper treats the PW and the SW as two distinct worries.

Each proposal put forward thus far has also sought to be consistent with the resistibility of divine grace. Richard Cross, Elenore Stump, and Kevin Timpe have all sought to avoid the SW by appealing to the notion of quiescence.<sup>5</sup> Roughly construed, these authors propose that God moves the quiescent will, which “neither assents nor rejects” God’s grace, to exercise saving faith.<sup>6</sup>

Cyr and Flummer maintain that while Cross, Stump, and Timpe successfully avoid the SW, these authors leave the PW intact.<sup>7</sup> According to Cross, for example, an agent is moved to accept God’s grace so long as they quiesce. But, Cyr and Flummer argue that since the agent could have resisted God’s grace had they decided to, and choose the best alternative available to them by quiescing, the person is responsible and praiseworthy for their quiescence. Cyr and Flummer maintain that Stump fails to avoid the PW for similar reasons. Timpe agrees with Stump and Cross, that a person will be brought to faith if they become quiescent, or omit from resisting God’s grace. Timpe’s proposal makes it more explicit however that what determines a person’s quiescence is a prior act of will that suffices to make that person responsible for their quiescence. Timpe underscores the point that since persons bring about their salvation via omission they are only quasi-causes of the event.<sup>8</sup> But, as Cyr and Flummer point out, even if salvation is only quasi-caused by a person if the omission is grounded in a prior

---

<sup>3</sup> Kevin Timpe, *Free Will in Philosophical Theology* (New York: Bloomsbury, 2013), 57. For further analysis of how the Semi-Pelagian worry can be avoided see Richard Cross, “Anti-Pelagianism and the Resistibility of Grace,” *Faith and Philosophy* 22, no. 2 (2005): 199-210, accessed July 20, 2022, doi: 10.5840/faithphil200522230.

<sup>4</sup> Taylor W. Cyr and Matthew T. Flummer, “Free Will, Grace, and Anti-Pelagianism,” *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion* 83, no. 2 (2017): 8.

<sup>5</sup> Timpe construes the notion of quiescence as an omission of the will. He writes; “we can adapt Dowe’s account of “causation by omission” to show how quiescence is an omission that quasi-causes the act of saving faith”. Kevin Timpe, *Free Will in Philosophical Theology* (New York: Bloomsbury, 2013), 65.

<sup>6</sup> Cyr and Flummer, “Free Will, Grace, and Anti-Pelagianism,” 15.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, 22.

<sup>8</sup> Quasi-cause denotes an indirect or partial role in the causation of an event, rather than a full or direct cause.

act of will for which agents are responsible, then agents are praiseworthy for the events leading up to their salvation.

Thus, a holistic account of faith should be mindful of the SW, lest the agent is understood to be a cause of their salvation. Moreover, the account should be mindful of the PW, lest the agent is understood to be praiseworthy for the events culminating in their salvation. Cyr and Flummer argue many of the models put forward so far avoid the SW but do not succeed in avoiding the PW.<sup>9</sup> Cyr and Flummer offer three suggestions for avoiding the PW, each of which will be assessed below.<sup>10</sup>

### 3. STRATEGIES FOR AVOIDING THE PRAISEWORTHINESS WORRY

Cyr and Flummer outline three different ways for overcoming the PW. They suggest the PW can be avoided if either (1) the omission culminating in salvation is not morally good, (2) persons lack the required moral standing to be praiseworthy for the omission, or (3) the fulfillment of moral duty is not a sufficient condition to be praiseworthy.<sup>11</sup> It will be helpful to briefly assess each strategy.

#### *a) Omissions Are Not Good<sup>12</sup>*

First, the PW could be avoided if the proponent of quiescence denies that omitting to resist God's grace is morally good. Since the omission is not good, and praise is not due to someone unless they have done something good, persons are not praiseworthy for omitting to resist God's grace.

What the first proposal must explain is how omitting to resist God's grace, while the best available alternative to a person, fails to meet the standard of moral goodness. Stump argues omitting from resisting God's grace is comparatively better than resisting God's grace, but such a comparative value does not entail moral goodness. She writes:

It is true that a will in this condition is better than a will which wants sin and does not will to will goodness. But comparatives do not suppose positives. One thing can be better than another and yet not be good.<sup>13</sup>

---

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> Cyr and Flummer merely suggest these strategies as ways for avoiding the PW, they do not embrace or defend any one in particular.

<sup>11</sup> Throughout the paper I assume that persons and not actions are the proper object of praise.

<sup>12</sup> In what follows, let the reader understand that by 'omission' I mean omissions that culminate in salvation.

<sup>13</sup> Eleonore Stump, *Aquinas* (London: Routledge, 2003), 402-403.

The burden of proof for determining the positive moral value of quiescence thus lies with the person who endorses the claim that omissions are good when they are the best available alternative to the person. Two considerations weigh in favor of the claim that the omission from resisting God's grace is morally good.

The omission is not only the best available alternative to a person but also the result of good intentions. Presumably, the person knows that if he ceases to resist God's grace, then he will be saved. The salvation which culminates from the person's quiescence is the highest good achievable in life. The person who ceases resisting God's grace to allow God's grace to have its effect is thus intending to bring about one of the highest goods achievable. We should conclude that the quiescent person thus has a morally good intention.

One could perhaps deny that persons do have such good intentions. It could be that their omission was unintentional as Kirk MacGregor suggests, or that they have some ulterior motive. Proponents of the view that the omission is unintentional must explain why God couldn't save most if not all people as soon as they lapse into an unintentional state of quiescence.<sup>14</sup> Proponents of the ulterior motive view would have to explain how God could be just for creating saving faith in individuals who have some ulterior motive. Unless one finds either of these alternatives plausible, then it seems likely that quiescence is not only the best alternative available to people but that people who quiesce have morally good intentions which culminate in a morally good event.

Furthermore, omitting from resisting God's grace is morally obligatory. God commands all people to repent and believe, a command that is necessarily good since it is given by a morally perfect being. Given humanity's depravity, people cannot directly satisfy the requirements of the command, and can only indirectly satisfy it by ceasing to resist God's grace. God, still desiring for his command to be satisfied, would desire that people satisfy his command by way of quiescence. If God's desires in some sense constitute our moral obligations then ceasing to resist God's grace is morally obligatory.

We should agree with Stump then, that comparatives do not necessarily support positives. An omission is not good merely in virtue of being better than some other alternative. However, an omission could be morally good based on other conditions. If one is convinced that the omission to resist God's grace is well-intentioned, morally obligatory, and the best available means for achieving the highest good, then one should conclude that the omission to resist God's grace is also morally good. Those seeking to deny the goodness of quiescence would

---

<sup>14</sup> Kirk R. MacGregor, "Monergistic Molinism," *Perichoresis* 16, no. 2 (2018): 77-92, accessed August 2, 2022, doi: 10.2478/perc-2018-0012. MacGregor proposes that persons unintentionally lapse into a state of quiescence. However, such a state is conceivably entered into by many if not all people. Thus, the conditions necessary for God to bring about a person's salvation are met by many if not all people, and God could conceivably save all of these people.

have to explain what other conditions must be met for quiescence to meet the threshold of moral goodness. It does not follow that since the omission is good it is necessarily praiseworthy. However, if one wishes to maintain that omitting to resist God's grace is unpraiseworthy, one should not reason from the omission's lack of moral goodness.

***b) Persons Are Not Good Enough***

Another alternative for avoiding the PW would be to affirm that the omission is good but claim that people lack the moral standing to be praiseworthy for their omissions. To be praiseworthy for an omission, a person must not be guilty of numerous offenses leading up to the omission. For example, if a person has repeatedly resisted God's grace, this has damaged their moral standing in such a way that no single omission could make them praiseworthy regardless of its moral goodness.

Two considerations weigh in favor of the second proposal. First, it does seem as if a person's moral standing factors into whether or not we value a moral act as praiseworthy. For example, a thief who decides to give back everything he has stolen is doing the right thing. But, the person who receives back what they have lost will not consider such an act or the actor praiseworthy. In fact, given the thief's moral track record leading up to his act of returning what he has stolen, we conceive of the act as unpraiseworthy. Therefore, a person's moral track record seems to factor into whether we consider that person praiseworthy for fulfilling their duties.

Furthermore, the moral standing condition provides a powerful explanation as to why people are not morally praiseworthy for the exercise of faith. How so? Given their poor moral standing, the unbeliever with the duty to believe is no different than a thief with the duty to return his ill-gotten gain. If it were not because of the universally poor moral standing of humanity God would not have "set the bar so low", by making faith the duty for humanity's salvation. But, since no unbeliever could meet the conditions of having a praiseworthy moral standing, God in his grace, sets the bar at faith, which is why Paul can claim if salvation is by faith and not by works of the law, then there can be no room for boasting. The unbeliever cannot take credit, or be worthy of praise, for meeting the duty of faith because that duty is analogous to returning his ill-gotten gain. A person cannot be praiseworthy for keeping a duty that is a reflection of the poor moral standing they had in the first place. Thus, it seems good moral standing is one of the necessary conditions for a person to be considered praiseworthy when he keeps moral obligations.

***c) Keeping an Obligations is Unpraiseworthy***

Finally, Cyr and Flummer suggest that PW can be avoided by maintaining that persons are not morally praiseworthy for fulfilling their duties. In contrast to the

second proposal, the final proposal does not suggest that good moral standing is a necessary condition for persons to be considered praiseworthy. Rather, the final proposal simply rejects the notion that keeping moral duties suffices to make a person praiseworthy- the so-called moral duty threshold. As suggested in the example of a thief returning his ill-gotten gain, one might suppose that the thief is not praiseworthy for such an action because his actions are obligatory. Furthermore, it might seem unlikely to some that parents are worthy of being praised for fulfilling their obligation to care for a child since that act of caring for a child is what parents ought to do. We will discuss whether these moral intuitions can be trusted below, and consider whether the final alternative conflicts with our understanding of assigning God praise for meeting self-imposed duties, such as keeping his promises.

#### 4. ABANDONING THE MORAL DUTY THRESHOLD<sup>15</sup>

I propose the following solution for avoiding the PW. A necessary condition for a person to be considered praiseworthy is a morally excellent character. The fulfillment of any obligation, or the performance of any action, is not sufficient to make a person morally praiseworthy. Therefore, no one is praiseworthy for merely having done anything. Nevertheless, the fulfillment of some obligation or the performance of some action could demonstrate the morally praiseworthy characteristics of a person. It could be appropriate to say that “someone is due praise for some action” if what one means is that person's act demonstrates their praiseworthiness. It would be inappropriate to say “someone is due praise for some action” if what one means is that the act in and of itself makes the person praiseworthy. Finally, a person is deserving of praise when they perform some action that demonstrates their morally excellent character. Of course, absent the performance a person could still be worthy of praise given their morally excellent character, but absent the performance no one would know that a person is deserving of praise, and thus it is right that persons are praised when having performed some actions. Let us now consider how the proposal accounts for the following three features of praise: (1) God’s praiseworthiness, (2) the

<sup>15</sup> For recent discussions on the threshold for meriting moral praise see: Martin Montminy, "Microcredit and the Threshold of Praiseworthiness," *Analytic Philosophy* 63, no. 1 (2022): 328-43. Daniel Telech, "Praise," *Philosophy Compass* 17, no. 10 (2022): e12876, <https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12876>. Nathan Stout, "On the Significance of Praise," *American Philosophical Quarterly* 57, no. 3 (2020): 215-226. Andrew S. Eshleman, "Worthy of Praise: Responsibility and Better-than-Minimally-Decent Agency," in David Shoemaker and Neal Tognazzini, eds., *Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility*, Volume 2: 'Freedom and Resentment' at 50 (Oxford: Oxford Academic, 2014; online edn, Oxford Academic, 19 Mar. 2015), <https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198722120.003.0011>. Michael McKenna, *Conversation and Responsibility* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012). Blake Harris, "The Goodness-Character Threshold for Praiseworthiness" (unpublished manuscript).

praiseworthiness of fulfilling demanding duties, and (3) the varying degrees of praise.

***a) Is God Praiseworthy for Keeping His Promises?***

Cyr and Flummer raise a potential objection for those who reject the moral duty threshold. They write; “it seems to imply that God is not praiseworthy for much of what he is typically praised. For example, if God makes a promise to someone, God must keep his promise; yet it would be strange to say that God is not praiseworthy for keeping his promises.”<sup>16</sup>

Given the proposal stated above, let us compare the actions of God keeping a promise, and unbelievers exercising faith. Neither of these actions in and of themselves makes the actor praiseworthy. Nevertheless, in the case of God, keeping a promise demonstrates some praiseworthy characteristics such as his graciousness or faithfulness. Whereas, in the case of the unbeliever, exercising faith does not demonstrate some praiseworthy characteristic but rather it demonstrates their poor moral standing and need for forgiveness, atonement, reconciliation, and so on. When we say that “God is praiseworthy for keeping his promises” we should not be understood to mean that the act of promise-keeping made God praiseworthy. For, understood in this way, God would not be praiseworthy before keeping his promises. But, it would seem greater to conceive of God as still being worthy of praise even if he has no promises to keep, or even if he had never created. Therefore, the statement “God is praiseworthy for keeping his promises” is best understood to mean that promise-keeping serves to demonstrate the praiseworthy characteristics of God. Is God deserving of praise when he performs some action or keeps a promise? Yes. Because when God performs some action or keeps a promise it demonstrates his moral excellence, which would not have been known had God refrained from performing the action in question.

In sum, God’s character is what makes him praiseworthy, which in turn is demonstrated through his promise-keeping, which in turn gives us knowledge that he is deserving of praise. The praiseworthiness dilemma need not worry the proponent of the view that faith is a moral obligation for which persons are unpraiseworthy, since abandoning the moral duty threshold does not infringe upon God’s praiseworthiness.

***b) Are Persons Praiseworthy For Fulfilling Demanding Duties?***

The proposal rests on the assumption that we are rational to trust our intuitions for rejecting the moral duty threshold for making persons praiseworthy. Martin Montminy has recently argued, however, that we should not trust the intuitions

---

<sup>16</sup> Cyr and Flummer, 26.



that lead us to reject the moral duty threshold. He argues that “the threshold for praiseworthiness should be set at actions that fulfill moral obligation”.<sup>17</sup> Persons who perform morally praiseworthy actions are not necessarily praiseworthy. There may be other conditions people need to meet to be praiseworthy. However, actions are praiseworthy if they meet the threshold of obligation, which means supererogatory actions are also praiseworthy because they are above that threshold.

As it stands, Montminy's view does not present a problem for the proposal. For one could concede that an act is morally praiseworthy since it fulfills a moral obligation, but deny that persons are morally praiseworthy for actions given their moral standing. Montminy writes; “the mere fact that an agent’s action reaches the threshold of praiseworthiness does not automatically make her praiseworthy for the action”.<sup>18</sup> However, the proposal under consideration would be less plausible if we had to affirm that the exercise of faith is praiseworthy even though the person who exercises it is not. Moreover, as we shall see, Montminy does argue that fulfilling an obligation could also suffice to make a person praiseworthy.

Montminy claims we should not trust our initial intuitions for rejecting the obligation threshold because meeting some moral duties may be particularly demanding on some people. For example, the obligation to refrain from stealing is demanding on kleptomaniacs. The demanding nature of some duties does not count in favor of accepting the moral obligation threshold, however. Montminy is right to point out that duties can vary in demand depending on a person’s temperament. Nevertheless, Contrary to what Montminy concludes, such an observation does not show that praise should be assigned to actions that meet the threshold of obligation. What such an example demonstrates is that the demanding nature of the obligations requires a different threshold of praise. The criterion for assigning praise the consideration might establish is as follows: when a duty is very demanding given a person's temperament then fulfilling that duty is praiseworthy. We are therefore not left with a reason to accept the moral duty threshold but have been provided a new threshold for assigning persons praise.

Perhaps Montminy is making the weaker claim that assigning praise to duties that are particularly demanding for some people is consistent with the obligation threshold. However, the intuition that fulfilling demanding moral duties is praiseworthy could also in part be explained by the virtue a person requires to fulfill such duties. For example, the reason we might ascribe praise to

---

<sup>17</sup> Martin Montminy, "Microcredit and the Threshold of Praiseworthiness," *Analytic Philosophy* 63, no. 1 (2022): 30.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid.

the kleptomaniac who fulfills his duty to resist the urge to steal is that his resistance demonstrates a particular virtue such as self-restraint, a virtue not displayed by others who do not have to resist a similar inclination. It follows that meeting the duty to not steal is not sufficiently praiseworthy. But, we tend to ascribe praise to the kleptomaniac for not stealing because his omission demonstrates moral excellence in a way that another person's omission may not. Thus, the phenomenon of demanding duties does count in favor of the moral obligation threshold anymore than it does the above-mentioned proposal.

***c) Why Does Praise Come in Degrees?***

Montminy also argues that we should doubt the intuitions which count against the obligation threshold because praise comes in degrees. The graded nature of praise explains why most people are not able to discern when small amounts of credit are due to a person for fulfilling their moral duties. For, if the obligation threshold is correct then we'd expect praiseworthiness to accrue to persons as they establish a track record of fulfilling their moral obligations

However, even if the phenomenon of micro-praise is consistent with the moral duty threshold, it might also be consistent with other views. According to the proposal, praise could come in degrees depending on the degree to which a person has displayed morally excellent qualities and the degree to which they possess those qualities. If this is the case, then we'd expect it to be difficult to discern when people are due small amounts of praise. The phenomenon of micro-praise does not count in favor of the obligation threshold any more than it does our proposal. Since the phenomenon of micro-praise is consistent with both the obligation threshold and other views, Montminy's argument for microcredit does not directly favor the moral duty threshold.

Moreover, it is doubtful that praiseworthiness accrues to a person solely based on them keeping their moral duties, regardless of how frequently they keep them. Why not suppose instead, that some other condition is also necessary for keeping a moral obligation to be praiseworthy? Montminy hints at such a suggestion when he writes; "assuming that she has the right motivations, she is praiseworthy for this impressive record".<sup>19</sup> This admission is telling as it hints at what our proposal suggests- which is that some moral character traits that undergird good intentions are part of what makes a person praiseworthy when they fulfill moral obligations.

Montminy considers a view similar to the one we propose above but rejects it on the basis that it would negate praise due to someone based on meeting their moral requirements. He writes; "according to this answer the [ethical] shopkeeper is praiseworthy not for his individual pricing decisions and deliberations, but for

---

<sup>19</sup> Martin Montminy, "Microcredit and the Threshold of Praiseworthiness," 32.

his character traits such as honesty and steadfastness”.<sup>20</sup> However, the above proposal does not suggest that moral excellence and fulfilling moral duties are competing reasons *for* making a person praiseworthy. The ethical shopkeeper is praiseworthy based on his moral excellent qualities such as honesty, qualities which are then demonstrated by way of his moral decision-making. His decision-making thus makes evident that he is praiseworthy for his moral excellence, and provides the circumstance for our ascriptions of praise. We say “he is praiseworthy for his actions” not because those actions make him praiseworthy, but because they demonstrate his praiseworthy characteristics. Had the same actions been done by someone with evil motives they would not be praiseworthy for the actions on account of their poor moral character.

The graded nature of praise is therefore consistent with the above proposal and does not demand that one adopt the moral duty threshold. Furthermore, it is doubtful that the accrual of praise is best explained by the moral duty threshold. For, if praise accrues solely based on actions, then people with evil intentions could be praiseworthy actors. More than likely, persons are more or less praiseworthy in virtue of their varying degrees of moral excellence as demonstrated in varying degrees through their decision-making. Thus, none of the above-mentioned three features of praise provide any reason for thinking that people are praiseworthy for keeping their moral duties, and therefore it is rational to believe that persons are not praiseworthy for the exercise of faith.

## 5. CONCLUSION

The praiseworthiness dilemma arises from the assumption that keeping moral obligation makes one praiseworthy. I have attempted to show how that assumption could plausibly be rejected. When an unbeliever exercises faith he fulfills a moral obligation, but that obligation does not demonstrate a praiseworthy character. Therefore, he is not due praise for the action. When God keeps his moral obligations it does demonstrate his praiseworthy character, and thus he is due praise for the action. While in both cases God and unbelievers are fulfilling a moral obligation, the satisfaction of the obligation is not what makes the actor praiseworthy. Satisfying moral obligations could make others know that someone is worthy of praise, without being the thing that makes a person praiseworthy.

I have not argued that fulfilling the moral obligation to exercise faith is incapable of demonstrating a person's praiseworthy qualities. However, given the biblical description of an unbeliever's moral status, I find it unlikely that the exercise of faith in any way demonstrates praiseworthy characteristics.

---

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., 33.

Moreover, given the implausibility of the moral duty threshold, keeping the moral obligation to exercise faith does not make one inherently praiseworthy. Neither have I argued that abandoning the moral duty threshold resolves the SW. The nature of the SW and how it can be avoided requires much more theological reflection than offered in this paper. Rather, all that has been shown is that keeping moral obligations need not be understood to make a person morally praiseworthy, even though in God's case it could demonstrate his praiseworthy characteristics. In conclusion, the person who understands faith to be the satisfaction of a moral obligation need not be worried about the problem of moral praise.

**BIBLIOGRAFÍA**

- Cross, Richard. "Anti-Pelagianism and the Resistibility of Grace." *Faith and Philosophy* 22, no. 2 (2005): 199-210. Accessed July 20, 2022. doi: 10.5840/faithphil200522230.
- Cyr, Taylor W., and Matthew T. Flummer. "Free Will, Grace, and Anti-Pelagianism." *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion* 83, no. 2 (2017): 1-22.
- Eshleman, Andrew S. "Worthy of Praise: Responsibility and Better-than-Minimally-Decent Agency." In *Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, Volume 2: 'Freedom and Resentment' at 50*, edited by David Shoemaker and Neal Tognazzini. Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility. Oxford: Oxford Academic, 2014. Online ed, Oxford Academic, 19 Mar. 2015. <https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198722120.003.0011>.
- Harris, Blake. "The Goodness-Character Threshold for Praiseworthiness." Unpublished manuscript.
- MacGregor, Kirk R. "Monergistic Molinism." *Perichoresis* 16, no. 2 (2018): 77-92. Accessed August 2, 2022. doi: 10.2478/perc-2018-0012.
- McKenna, Michael. *Conversation and Responsibility*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012.
- Montminy, Martin. "Microcredit and the Threshold of Praiseworthiness." *Analytic Philosophy* 63, no. 1 (2022): 23-37.
- Stump, Eleonore. *Aquinas*. London: Routledge, 2003.
- Timpe, Kevin. *Free Will in Philosophical Theology*. New York: Bloomsbury, 2013.
- Telech, Daniel. "Praise." *Philosophy Compass* 17, no. 10 (2022): e12876. <https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12876>.